Preventing Iran from Developing Nuclear Weapons Using Plutonium

Sat, 11 Apr 2026 19:09:00 +0200

The article by Henry Sokolski highlights concerns about Iran’s potential to develop nuclear weapons through plutonium extracted from spent fuel at the Bushehr reactor. While U.S. and Israeli efforts have focused on preventing uranium enrichment, the author argues that the plutonium pathway has received insufficient attention. Bushehr, operated by Russia’s ROSATOM since 2011, contains approximately 210 tons of spent fuel, enough plutonium to produce over 200 nuclear weapons. Historical research demonstrates that separating plutonium can be done in small, inconspicuous facilities within months, and converting it into bomb-ready material could take one to two weeks if Iran has a device ready. The author stresses that reactor-grade plutonium is sufficient for nuclear weapons yields, contrary to popular belief. Previous U.S. administrations have monitored Bushehr, but oversight has been inconsistent. Sokolski recommends continuous surveillance of spent fuel and including stringent monitorin